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We can distinguish between what someone does—their actions—and what merely happens to them. Punching John was an action of Janet\'s, but falling over was not an action of John\'s.
Not all bodily movements are actions. If someone else lifts my arm, then the rising of my arm is not an action of mine. A movement of a subject\'s body is an action only if it is preceded by an appropriate intention of theirs. But it is not enough, for a bodily movement to be an action, that it is preceded by an appropriate intention of theirs. Suppose a doctor asks me to raise my recently paralysed arm, that I intend to raise my arm and that the doctor then raises it. I intended to raise my arm and it rose. But the rising of my arm was not an action of mine, because my intention did not cause my bodily movement. A movement of a subject\'s body is an action only if it is caused by an appropriate intention of theirs. This is the central claim of the causal theory of action.
Not all actions are bodily movements, and the causal theory of action also applies to mental actions such as imagining and calculating. It is not enough for imagining a teddy bear that one has an image as of a teddy bear. If a hallucinogenic drug causes me to have an image as of a teddy bear, then I have not imagined a teddy bear, since my having the image as of a teddy bear is something that has happened to me, rather than an action of mine. Having an image is an action of mine only if it is preceded by my having an appropriate intention. And if, as a matter of complete coincidence, I intended to imagine a toy just before a hallucinogenic drug caused me to have an image as of a teddy bear, then I have not imagined a teddy bear. A mental event is an action only it is caused by an appropriate intention of the subject\'s. AJ
See also consequentialism; causal theories; freedom and determinism; responsibility and moral luck.Further reading D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events; , L. Davis, Theory of Action. |
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