| |
A volition is an act of will. Some philosophers argue that an event is an action only if it is appropriately caused by a prior volition. One problem for this theory is that if volitions are themselves acts of will, if volitions are mental actions, and an event is an action only if it is appropriately caused by a prior volition, then every volition must itself be appropriately caused by a prior volition. When I act upon the physical world, perhaps by opening a door, my physical movement is appropriately caused by a prior volition. And that volition must be appropriately caused by a prior volition. And that volition must be appropriately caused by a prior volition. And so on, in an infinite regress.
Others hold that volitions are tryings or attempts to perform an action. They argue that since there is always the possibility that one will fail to perform the action one wants to perform (my arm may always be suddenly paralysed just as I am about to reach for my cup) one must always attempt to perform the action one wants to perform. AJ
Further reading B. O\'Shaughnessy, The Will; , G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind. |
|
